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Steven A. Waters* and Florence P. Berkley**
TEXAS cases in the partnership area are as plentiful this year as they
were scarce last year.' For the reader's convenience, the cases are
grouped under topical headings corresponding to the most important
partnership feature of the case. This survey provides a reasonably complete
overview of Texas partnership law activity for the survey period. The reader
is cautioned, however, that federal bankruptcy court opinions provide a fer-
tile ground for the discussion of partnership law issues arising from the
bankruptcy of a partner or partnership. These'decisions often produce valu-
able insights into partnership law issues. In addition, they highlight the in-
terplay between partnership law and bankruptcy law.
1. PLEDGE OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
Thomas v. Price.2 The opening paragraph of Thomas, the most significant
and controversial case reported in this survey, suggested that this would not
be a run of the mill case:
This case was filed on May 9, 1986,3 and has floundered ever since on
the docket of this Court. The parties are interminably mired in an acri-
monious confrontation that involves issues of first impression in Texas
jurisprudence. In an attempt to refocus this litigation, the Court or-
dered the parties to rebrief the Price defendants' second motion for
summary judgment. The Court also had the parties brief some addi-
tional matters. The Court has reviewed the briefs of the parties and will
now apply its interpretation of Texas law to the facts so that this entire
case can be put into perspective and this litigation concluded.4
The issues in Thomas, which were of first impression in Texas, concerned
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.M., M.F.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Haynes and Boone, Aus-
tin, Texas.
1. See Gray, Vletas, & Waters, Corporation and Partnerships, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 221, 251-56 (1989).
2. 718 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
3. The case began even earlier in the state of New York: Thomas v. Price, 631 F. Supp.
114 (S.D. N.Y. 1986).
4. 718 F. Supp. at 600. Other statements by the court indicated that the court was not
favorably disposed toward the plaintiff (SLT): "The plaintiff doggedly persisted in trying to
discover every document that could possibly be associated with the case. The end result was to
delay disposition... . "[T]he court thought it important that certain legal issues be addressed
before allowing the plaintiff to further muddy the turbid waters of this litigation." Id at 604.
The plaintiff also sought, unsuccessfully, to recuse the court. Id.
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the consequences to a partner and partnership of the partner's pledging as
security for a loan his interest in the profits and surplus, and management, of
a partnership.5 The court termed those consequences "serious," concluding
that on the partner's default under the security agreement: (1) the secured
creditor acquired an immediate right to receive the debtor partner's interest
in profits and surplus; (2) the secured creditor acquired the debtor partner's
management rights, although the secured creditor could not exercise those
rights without the consent of the remaining partner; (3) the debtor partner
ceased to be a partner in the partnership; and (4) there was a dissolution of
the partnership.6
The relevant facts of the case for purposes of this discussion include the
following:
(1) Plaintiff SLT, a partner in a two-partner partnership, borrowed
$750,000 from Newcomb (an affiliate of the other partner) to fund certain of
SLT's capital contributions to the partnership. The loan was non-recourse
and was secured by a security interest in SLT's " 'right, title and interest in
its interest in the Partnership, as such interest is defined by Section 26 of the
Uniform Partnership Act of the State of Texas'," and in SLT's share of pro-
ceeds attributable to its interest in the partnership.7 The security agreement
provided that Newcomb (the secured party) had no right to interfere in the
management of the partnership in the absence of a default.
(2) SLT defaulted by not paying its note at maturity and was advised on
November 26, 1985 by the secured party (Newcomb's assignee) that the
pledged partnership interest would be retained in full satisfaction of SLT's
$750,000 note, unless SLT objected within 21 days, in which case the collat-
eral would be sold at a private or public sale under Section 9-505(b) of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code.
(3) SLT objected to disposition under section 9-505(b) and insisted on
disposition at a sale under section 9-504, and by letter dated December 20,
the secured party notified SLT that a private sale would take place on or
after January 8.
(4) To preserve the collateral (according to the secured party), the se-
cured party removed SLT's affiliates from the management committee of the
bank owned by the partnership and replaced them with the secured party's
nominees. The other partner authorized the nominees to exercise the man-
agement rights.
(5) After a series of letters were exchanged, meetings held, and lawsuits
filed in New York and Texas, on September 10, 1986, the secured party sold
the partnership interest in a private sale to an affiliate of the secured party.
In the words of the court, "[o]ver the next twenty-five months, the case fol-
5. Id. at 605. The court asked whether the partner's loss of management rights caused a
dissolution, and what liability the partner had to third parties for actions taken by the partner-
ship after the partner lost its management rights.
6. Id. at 612.
7. Id. at 601.
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lowed a tortuous path."
The court began by examining the elements or incidents of a partnership
interest under Texas law.9 It identified three factors: (1) the sharing of prof-
its and losses; (2) the participation in the control of the management of the
partnership; and (3) the interest, as a tenant in partnership, in specific part-
nership property. The court found the control element to be the most signif-
icant criterion, and found the first two elements, but not the third, to be
assignable under Texas law.10
These elements were important to the court's conclusions. The court
found that under the SLT-Newcomb security agreement, SLT immediately
lost its interest in profits and surplus and its management rights when it
defaulted in paying its note, but concluded that the secured party was not
automatically entitled to exercise those management rights."1 The court
found that before the security interest in the partnership interest was fore-
closed, SLT lost all of its incidents of partnership and, therefore, partnership
status. 1 2 When the other partner allowed the secured party to participate in
management after SLT's default, the secured party became a partner.13 The
court concluded that SLT ceased to be a partner when it defaulted, but that
it could become a partner again before foreclosure by redeeming its interest
in the partnership by paying the amount due on its debt. Foreclosure cut off
that right of redemption. 14
The court further concluded that when SLT lost its status as a partner,
dissolution of the partnership occurred. 15 Additionally, the court said that
the foreclosure resulted in a dissolution of the partnership, which had no
effect on the sole remaining partner's ability to continue the business of the
partnership. 16 The court's pronouncement of the partnership's dissolution is
8. I.k at 604.
9. Id. at 605. The court said that to determine whether SLT ceased to be a partner
required an examination of what constitutes a partnership.
10. Id. It is not customary to refer to the management right as being assignable because it
cannot be assigned without the agreement of the other partners. TEx. REv. Cv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b, § 27(1) (Vernon 1970).
11. 718 F. Supp. at 606. The New York court's position is at odds with the Texas court's
conclusion on management rights. 631 F. Supp. at 124. The New York court stated that on
SLT's default, the secured party "was entitled.., to take possession of the collateral... and
then to participate directly in 'the management, administration, affairs and control' of the
Bank Partnership," Id
12. 718 F. Supp. at 607, n. 67. The court's discussion here proves curious.
13. Id at 608.
14. Id at 607, n. 67.
15. Id. at 607.
16. Id. at 608. Without suggesting that the court was wrong to conclude that one person
could continue the partnership's business as a newly constituted partnership pending the ad-
mission of a second partner, it seems somewhat anomalous that the court was so very quick to
conclude that SLT lost its partnership status immediately on a default, and then to find that
the other partner could, alone, form a new partnership to continue the business, and invoke as
partial authority for that position a case that states that the remaining partners can continue
the business of a dissolved partnership. The partnership act clearly states that a partnership
consists of two or more persons. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 6(l) (Vernon
1970). The court bootstrapped its position, admitting that it gave no significance to the plural
term "partners," by pointing to the fact that a partnership is an entity distinct from its part-
ners. 718 F. Supp. at 608, note 75.
1990]
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indicative of its confusion:
Regardless of whether the secured party obtains the right to participate
in the management of the partnership, the debtor ceases to be a partner
because the criteria that creates a partnership must continually exist.
Accordingly, there is a dissolution because there is a change in the rela-
tion of the partners.' 7
This confuses cause and effect. The debtor does not cease to be a partner
because the criteria that create a partnership do not exist; surely, the court
meant that the debtor's loss of incidents of ownership of a partnership inter-
est resulted in its not being a partner, which, in turn, resulted in dissolution.
The court further found that the winding up required pursuant to Sections
29 and 30 of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act is limited to paying off the
former partner." Here, the court reasoned that no payment was required to
be made to the former partner for its interest in partnership property be-
cause that was not a "financial interest," and the partner's interest in profits
and surplus had already passed to the secured party.' 9
Resolution of the liability issue flowed relatively naturally from the court's
other decisions on partner status. The court held that SLT was liable for
debts that arose before November 26, the default notice date as of which the
court found that SLT ceased to be a partner, but not for liabilities arising
after that date.20 Consistent with its position that the secured party became
a partner on the date that it was authorized by the remaining partner to
exercise management rights, the court found that the secured party was lia-
ble as a partner from the date on which its management nominees were au-
thorized to exercise the management rights of SLT (December 20), rather
than from the date ten months later when the foreclosure sale was
conducted. 21
In summary, the court concluded, among other things, the following:
1. On default, the secured creditor receives an immediate right to receive
SLT's interest in profits and surplus;
2. Also on default, the secured party obtains SLT's management rights,
but has no right to interfere in the management of the partnership without
the consent of the remaining partner;
17. Id at 612.
18. 718 F. Supp at 608.
19. Id. at 609. Cutting off SLT's liability at the moment dissolution occurred, and making
the debtor liable only for pre-existing obligations of the partnership at that point, was not
necessarily correct. The Texas Uniform Partnership Act provides that after dissolution a part-
ner can bind the partnership by "any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or
completing transactions unfinished at dissolution," or by "any transaction which would bind
the partnership if dissolution had not taken place," provided that the creditor previously ex-
tended credit to the partnership and had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution or that a
creditor that had not previously extended credit had nevertheless known of the partnership
prior to dissolution and the notice of dissolution had not been advertised in a newspaper of
general circulation. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 35(l)(a) and (b) (Vernon 1970).
It is possible that the post-dissolution liabilities were outside these categories, but the court did
not appear to base its position on that.
20. 718 F. Supp. at 609.
21. Id at 610.
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3. Regardless of whether the secured creditor receives the right to par-
ticipate in management, SLT ceases to be a partner because the criteria that
create the partnership ceased to exist;
4. Because SLT ceased to be a partner, there was a change in the rela-
tionship of the partners and, consequently, a dissolution of the partnership;
5. The remaining partner may continue the partnership and winding up
is required only to the limited extent of paying off SLT, but under the pres-
ent facts no winding up is required because SLT is not entitled to any com-
pensation, since the financial interest in the partnership property had already
passed to the secured party;
6. SLT's liability to third parties is limited to those obligations existing
before its loss of partnership status; and
7. Once the secured party receives the consent of the remaining partner
to exercise the management rights of SLT, the secured party becomes a part-
ner, but its liability for pre-existing debts is not personal in nature.22
There are a number of flaws in the court's reasoning; this summary, how-
ever, focuses on the court's conclusion that SLT ceased to be a partner im-
mediately upon default in paying its obligation to the secured creditor. That
conclusion is the basis of many of the court's conclusions and therefore
should be scrutinized.
The court does not indicate that the partnership agreement provides for
automatic loss of partnership status on SLT's default under the security
agreement. Unless there is such a provision in the partnership agreement or
in the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, the court's conclusion is wrong. The
court unpersuasively contends that a provision in the partnership agreement
providing for dissolution of the partnership "when any partner makes an
assignment for the benefit of creditors," is applicable to this case.23 The
court, tacitly recognizing that the security agreement does not constitute an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, argues wealdy that "the mere making
of an assignment is not enough to create a dissolution. The intended effect of
this subsection only occurs in a case like this when the secured party acts or
seeks to protect its security interest through the foreclosure process." 24 The
court's argument would have supported the position that a simple pledge,
without more, does not abridge a prohibition on assignment; here, however,
the analysis is weakened considerably by a provision in the partnership
agreement that expressly permits each partner to grant a security interest in
its share of the profits and surplus of the partnership. 25
Further, the Texas Uniform Partnership Act does not support the court's
conclusion. Rather, the section of the Act that addresses the absolute as-
signment of a partner's interest supports the opposite result. The Texas Uni-
form Partnership Act provides that "[a] conveyance by a partner of his
interest in the partnership does not of itself dissolve the partnership, nor as
22. Id. at 612.
23. Id at 607, n. 69.
24. Id
25. Id. at 606
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against the other partners in the absence of agreement, entitle the assignee,
during the continuance of the partnership, to interfere in the management or
administration of the partnership business or affairs...; but it merely enti-
tles the assignee to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to
which the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled."'26 Thus, although
the security agreement permitted the secured party to receive the profits and
surplus immediately upon SLT's default, the court should have concluded
that the debtor remained a partner. The secured party is essentially an as-
signee, and thus presently entitled to receive profits and surplus.
The court also erroneously relied on sections of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code (Code)27 for the proposition that although SLT lost its
partner status on default, it had the right to redeem its interest and again
return to partner status before the sale of the collateral.28 The Code pro-
vides guidelines for a secured party's disposition of collateral on default.2 9
Section 9.504(d) of the Code states that "[w]hen collateral is disposed of by a
secured party after default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value
all of the debtor's rights therein."' 30 If, however, SLT lost its interest in
profits and surplus immediately on default,31 as the court concluded, then
SLT had no rights to be disposed of by the secured creditor in a section
9.504 foreclosure sale. Such an illogical result cannot support the court's
reasoning.
The court's conclusions may have been influenced by the special facts of
this case, notably that the "remaining" partner and the secured creditor
were related entities and that there was apparently no objection to the credi-
tor's becoming a partner.32 Another factor may have been SLT's challenge
to a transaction entered into by the partnership after SLT's default. 33 If the
court had found SLT still to be a partner, it would then have had to address
liability issues associated with that transaction. The confusion in the court's
opinion may stem, at least in part, from the confusing and often contradic-
tory stands taken by the parties, particularly the defendant. For example, on
April 12, 1986, almost five months after the secured party notified SLT of its
default, the management committee made a cash call on behalf of the part-
nership on SLT and the other party. The defendant's counsel, during a hear-
ing in the earlier New York case involving the same parties, stated to SLT
26. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 27 (Vernon 1970).
27. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.504(d) and 9.506 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
28. 718 F. Supp. at 607.
29. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990). "A secured party
after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral .... ." Id.
Section 9.504(c) provides that "[d]isposition of the collateral may be by public or private pro-
ceedings and may be made by way of one or more contracts." Id
30. Id. at § 9.504(d).
31. Recall that the court's holding went even further-the court found that SLT's man-
agements rights also automatically passed to the creditor, and SLT's partner status automati-
cally ended. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
32. One wonders, too, whether the court's references to SLT's attempts to muddy the
waters and SLT's efforts to recuse the court played a part in the result, as well. See footnote 4,
supra.
33. 718 F. Supp. at 610.
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that "I think it is accurate that you are still a partner in the bank."' 34 The
defendant later changed its position, however, and eventually argued that
SLT ceased to be a partner on the date of the notice of default, which notice
the defendant described as the "foreclosure." 35
The proper analysis, however, is that on default, SLT remained a partner,
but the secured creditor, pursuant to the security agreement and as an "as-
signee," was entitled to receive any profits and surplus owed to SLT. Also, if
the security agreement granted a security interest in the debtor's manage-
ment rights, and if the secured creditor was entitled to exercise those rights
on the default of SLT (subject to the consent of the other partner), then the
secured party also had the right to exercise SLT's management rights if the
other partner so consented. The court rejected SLT's argument that SLT's
consent to management by the secured creditor was necessary by relying on
its conclusion that the debtor was no longer a partner and therefore had no
right to consent.36 The court, however, could have rejected SLT's argument
by finding that the management rights, which the secured creditor was enti-
tled to exercise on SLT's default, included the right to consent to additional
partners.
One lesson to be learned from Thomas is that if the partnership agreement
permits partners to grant a security interest in their interest in the partner-
ship, then the partnership agreement should also specify what happens when
the partner defaults on the obligation secured by the partner's partnership
interest. For example, the partnership agreement should specify whether
such a default, by itself without further creditor action, causes a dissolution
of the partnership or whether other consequences flow from the default.
Further, the partnership agreement should require that all security agree-
ments be made expressly subject to the partnership agreement (they should
be anyway, but the courts and juries often benefit from the guidance), since it
may often be the case that the non-defaulting partners do not have such a
close relationship with the secured creditor. Finally and most importantly,
the security agreement should expressly state under what conditions the
partner's management rights may be exercised by the secured creditor.
2. PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION
a. Khalaf v. Williams.37 The partnership law issue in Khalaf concerned
the distinction between dissolution and termination of a partnership.38 The
plaintiff urged in his motion for new trial that the jury should have found, as
34. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Motion of Certain Defendants to Dismiss Counts I-V
and Count VII, Exhibits A and B.
35. Price Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, page8.
36. 718 F. Supp. at 607, n.67.
37. 763 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, rev'd on other grounds, 33 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 354 (Mar. 28, 1990).
38. Tnx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 30 (Vernon 1970) provides that "[o]n disso-




a matter of law, that the partnership was terminated. The court rejected the
plaintiff's contention, noting that the evidence of intent to dissolve did not
establish that the partnership was terminated as a matter of law. 39
In Khalaf the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written partnership
agreement by which the plaintiff would finance and the defendant would
build a country and western club that the partnership would operate. The
defendant later discovered that the plaintiff incorporated the business with-
out including the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant either left the job
site or was fired. The plaintiff sued for damages arising from breach of con-
tract and other claims and the defendant asserted counterclaims for breach
of contract and fraud. The jury entered a take nothing judgment for the
plaintiff and awarded the defendant $181, 22 9.8 5.40
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, as a matter of law, the jury should
have found that the partnership was terminated. The partnership agreement
called for the partnership to continue until a specified date, unless termi-
nated earlier by a partner's giving sixty days written notice or by the partner-
ship forming a corporation. The court noted that the partnership did not
create the corporation and that the notice given by the plaintiff failed to meet
the sixty days notice requirement.41 The court observed that, pursuant to
the Texas Uniform Partnership Act,42 a partner always has the power to
dissolve the partnership. 43 Dissolution, however, is distinct from termina-
tion, which occurs only after the winding up of partnership affairs." The
court overruled the point of error, noting that while the evidence indicated
an intent to dissolve, it apparently did not convince the jury that a termina-
tion occurred.45
b. Nazarian v. Thomas." In this suit for the value of an interest in a "joint
venture partnership" 47 brought by a partner who had given notice of dissolu-
tion, the court found that the dissolving partner's attempts to later rescind
his notice of dissolution were ineffective and that the partnership was dis-
solved.48 The court rejected the continuing partner's assertion that he had
consented to the reinstatement.49 The court found that the continuing part-
39. 763 S.W.2d at 871.
40. Id at 869.
41. Id at 871.
42. TEX. Rv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 31 (Vernon 1970).
43. 763 S.W.2d at 871.
44. Id.; see TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 30 (Vernon 1970).
45. 763 S.W.2d at 871. The court also determined that the plaintiff waived any error in
the form of the jury issues submitted regarding the termination. Id The plaintiff argued that
the jury could not properly decide damages to be awarded the defendant without determining
the termination date of the partnership. The special issue, however, instructed the jury to
determine the termination date only if the jury decided that the partnership was terminated.
Since the plaintiff had not objected to that issue, he did not preserve error. Id
46. 767 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
47. Id
48. Id. at 275.
49. Id. The court rejected the partner's contention that he consented to the reinstatement
in his pleadings that recited that the partnership was duly existing under the laws of the State
of Texas, noting that those pleadings were consistent with the prior pleadings of the partner,
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ner was obligated to pay the dissolving partner the value of his interest as of
the date of dissolution or to secure the payment of that amount by a bond.50
The court cited provisions in the Texas Uniform Partnership Act5 that give
the partner who did not wrongfully dissolve the partnership the right to con-
tinue the partnership for the agreed term.52 Those provisions also obligate
the continuing partner to pay the wrongfully dissolving partner the amount
of the value of the dissolving partner's interest, less the damages caused by
the dissolution. 53 The continuing partner in this case claimed no damages
caused by the dissolution; the court, therefore, found that he owed the dis-
solving partner the full value of that partner's interest. 54
c. Pate v. McClain." Pate involved an improperly worded special issue
submitted to the jury in a suit by a former partner in a law firm to recover
his net interest in two contingent fee contracts on dissolution of the partner-
ship. The jury found that the contingent fees were income of the partnership
and awarded the plaintiff his share of the gross profits.56 The court of ap-
peals found that there was sufficient evidence establishing that the contin-
gent fees were income of the partnership.57 The court found, however, that
the special issue requesting the jury to determine the amount that would
reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his unpaid share of the profits of the
partnership was improperly worded. 58 Recovery should have been limited
to the amount of money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his unpaid
share of the net profits of the partnership.59
3. DEFECTIVE FORMATION OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Hoagland v. Finholt.6" In Hoagland the trial court granted the plaintiff de-
claratory relief, finding that a limited partnership had, in law, not been cre-
which had alleged that the partnership, was dissolved and duly existing under the laws of the
State of Texas. Id This decision illustrates the point that a dissolved partnership remains in
existence until its affairs are wound up and its legal existence is terminated. See supra note 45.
50. 767 S.W.2d at 275.
51. Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 31(2), 38(2)(b) (Vernon 1970).
52. Id 767 S.W.2d at 274-75.
53. Id
54. Id
55. 769 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
56. Id at 358.
57. Id at 360. Two prior partnerships preceded the partnership in dissolution. The
court, in its statement of the facts, noted that both of the contingent fee contracts had been
entered into during the terms of the prior partnerships. Id at 359-60. Nevertheless, on the
formation of the new partnership, the office space remained the same, the files were un-
changed, the plaintiff actively participated in both cases and the partnership paid the expenses
in at least one of the two contingent fee cases. Although the facts are not clear, it appears that
there was no formal accounting on the winding down of the prior partnerships. There was
testimony that if the plaintiff had stayed with the firm, he would have shared in the other
contingent fee. Id. at 360.
58. Id. at 363. The court also noted that there was no written partnership agreement and
that all discussions of how profits and losses would be shared was oral. Id at 364. The court
opined that "[a] carefully drafted partnership agreement in writing may well have avoided this
lawsuit." Id
59. Id at 363.
60. 773 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
1990]
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ated and that the assets of the purported limited partnership reverted to the
plaintiff-general partner.61 Without reaching the issue of whether or not a
limited partnership had been formed, the appellate court reversed the judg-
ment of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 62 The
court found sufficient evidence of mutual consideration between the parties,
both in the form of their partnership agreement and in the benefits conferred
or detriments suffered. 63 The Hoagland court held that regardless of the
outcome of the partnership formation issue, the parties agreed to be co-own-
ers of certain property in the ratio of seventy-five percent to twenty-five
percent.64
The plaintiff-general partner's declaratory relief was based on the argu-
ment that because the limited partner made no contribution, a valid limited
partnership could not have been formed under the Texas Uniform Limited
Partnership Act,65 and, therefore, all of the partnership's property became
the property of the general partner.66 The court, while specifically reserving
the question of whether or not a partnership was formed, rejected the rever-
sion argument, holding instead that the situation was similar to a corpora-
tion without a valid charter; the corporation's assets are liquidated, creditors
are paid and the excess is distributed to the former shareholders or subscrib-
ers, as appropriate.67 The court found no better reason to forfeit the limited
partner's share of assets than there would have been to forfeit the plaintiff-
general partner's share.68
4. LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS
a. Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson's Landing Owners' Ass'n.69 This case con-
cerned the liability of a limited partner for assessments owed by the limited
partnership to a condominium owners' association. The association sued the
limited partnership and one of its limited partners, who was also the agent
for the limited partnership in managing the condominium, for failing to pay
assessments and for negligent failure to keep the books of the condominium
project in good order. The defendants appealed the trial court's judgment
against them.70 The limited partner raised a point of error based on its sta-
tus as a limited partner. The court noted that the safe harbor provisions in
the Texas Uniform Limited Partnership act specifically permit a limited
61. Id at 741.
62. Id at 744.
63. Id at 743-44.
64. Id at 742-43.
65. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (Vernon 1970).
66. 773 S.W.2d at 741. The court found a "reverse twist of irony" in the general partner's
having filed a certificate of limited partnership reciting a "SO" contribution by the limited
partner in exchange for a 25% partnership interest. Id
67. Id. at 744.
68. Id. at 743.
69. 758 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
70. Id. at 922. The defendants' first point of error was that the limited partnership had no
obligation, as developer, to pay the assessments. The court reviewed the condominium decla-
ration and determined that the limited partnership constituted an "owner" under the declara-
tion for the purpose of assessments. Id at 924.
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partner to exercise certain powers without becoming liable as a general
partner.71
The association contended that the liability of the limited partner was
based on the limited partner's own tortious conduct and its indemnification
obligations under the management agreement with the limited partnership,
rather than on its status as a limited partner. The court disagreed, however,
reasoning that the cause of action and the association's right to the assess-
ments were based on the covenants in the condominium declaration and not
on the limited partner's failure to properly collect the debt.72 The court also
dismissed the association's contention that the limited partner was liable to
the association based on its agreement to indemnify the limited partner-
ship.73 The court stated that a party other than the indemnitee can sue on
an indemnification contract only if the contract is clearly made for the bene-
fit of a third party.74
b. Stephens v. Angelina National Bank.75 Stephens stands for the proposi-
tion that a general partner who signs a partnership agreement and a partner-
ship certificate authorizing borrowing by the partnership from a bank will be
liable for debts incurred on behalf of the partnership pursuant to the agree-
ment and certificate.76 The case involved three notes that were signed by the
defendant's son. The evidence established that both the son and father had
signed a partnership agreement, a signature card for the partnership and a
partnership certificate authorizing borrowing by the partnership. The evi-
dence also indicated that the bank would not have made the loans to the son
alone, but rather relied on the father's financial strength. Further, the father
acknowledged voluntarily signing the partnership agreement and the bor-
rowing certificate. Certain tax records showed that the father was a general
partner in the partnership. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment for
the bank against the father on two grounds: (1) as a general partner of the
partnership under the partnership agreement and borrowing certificate and
(2) as a partner by invoking the doctrine of partner by estoppel. 77
5. EXCULPATORY PROVISIONS
Grider v. Boston Co., Inc.78 Grider involved an action by limited partners
against general partners to recover allegedly excessive professional and ad-
71. Id at 926; see TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
The court focused on § 8(b)(3), which states that a limited partner does not become liable as a
general partner merely by acting as a "contractor, agent, or employee of the partnership or of a




75. 772 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
76. Id at 550.
77. Id The partner by estoppel doctrine is set forth in TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 16 (Vernon 1970).
78. 773 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
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ministrative fees.79 The court of appeals upheld the trial court's judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant general partners, disregarding
the jury's verdict for $750,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive
damages.80 The partnership agreement gave virtually unfettered authority
to the general partner to expend partnership funds and to take all necessary
actions to accomplish the partnership's purposes, subject only to liability for
willful malfeasance or fraud. The partnership agreement further provided
that the general partner was to act as managing partner and provide to the
partnership certain administrative and management staff and services at
cost. The partnership agreement did not otherwise limit the general part-
ner's right to incur and receive reimbursement for administrative expenses.
The Grider court found no evidence of fraud or willful malfeasance in the
record and concluded that the partnership agreements fully protected the
general partner against liability for simple mismanagement, the greatest
complaint the court could find from the record. 81 In response to the plain-
tiff's breach of fiduciary duty allegations, the court observed that a fiduciary
can contract with his beneficiaries and can limit his liability, so long as equal
bargaining power exists.82 A fiduciary's ability to contract is also subject to
the public policy limitations precluding limitation of liability for (1) self-
dealing, (2) bad faith, (3) intentional adverse acts, and (4) reckless indiffer-
ence with respect to the beneficiary's best interest.8 3 The court found no
evidence of inappropriate self-dealing and noted that, while a fiduciary's self-
dealing does expose the transaction to scrutiny for fairness, it does not create
automatic liability.84
Based on the facts, including the partnership agreement, the Grider court
suggested that the case was submitted to the jury on the wrong theory.85 It
is difficult to determine from the opinion whether the plaintiff attempted to
make something of nothing, made the best of bad facts, or mustered and
presented the wrong facts. For example, one cannot tell from reading the
case whether an attack on the defendant's "cost" would have been success-
ful. Recall that the general partner was limited to recouping the cost of its
administrative and overhead services provided to the partnership.8 6 The
court easily concluded that, in the face of the protective language contained
in the partnership agreement, a simple showing that the charges were above
those customarily charged by other similarly situated partnerships was
insufficient.87
79. Id.
80. Id. at 339.
81. Id. at 341-42.
82. Id. at 343.
83. Id
84. Id.
85. Id. at 340.
86. Id at 341.
87. Id. at 340. Excessive charges were a key jury finding which lead to the trial court'sjudgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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6. NATURE OF PARTNER'S INTEREST
a. Harris v. Harris.88 In Harris, a divorce action, the court addressed the
characterization of a partner's interest in a partnership as community prop-
erty or separate property.8 9 At issue was the characterization of the hus-
band's partnership interest in his former law firm, and his interest in a
certain 30% contingent fee arrangement of the firm.90 In the trial below, the
court ruled that both interests were the husband's separate property.91 The
court of appeals, in affirming the judgment of the trial court,92 discussed the
entity theory of partnership adopted in Texas, stating that "partnership
property is owned by the partnership entity, not by the individual part-
ners.'" 93 Consequently, the court reasoned that partnership property is
neither separate nor community property.94 The partner's interest in the
partnership, his right to receive his share of partnership profits and surplus,
is subject to characterization as either separate or community property.95
The husband and wife in Harris had been married and divorced from each
other once before. In the prior divorce, the husband's partnership interest
was adjudged to be his separate property.96 During the second marriage, the
husband executed a second partnership agreement that controlled and al-
tered the terms of the husband's withdrawal from the firm. The court ruled,
however, that the husband's interest remained separate property, stating that
the second partnership agreement did not alter the characterization of the
husband's interest, since there was no evidence indicating the acquisition of
any additional interest during the second marriage.97 The court analogized
the stock splits and increases in enunciating the rule that "mutations and
increases in separate property remain separate property."' 8 Similarly, the
court found that the agreement concerning the division of the contingent fee
executed during the second marriage did not create any rights, but rather
clarified and defined each partner's share.99
While the court found that increases in the value of separate property
resulting from fortuitous circumstances such as stock splits will not be
recharacterized as community property, a right of reimbursement to the
88. 765 S.W.2d 798 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
89. Id at 800-01.
90. Id At trial, it was alleged that the value of the payments to the husband under a buy-
out agreement among the partners of the law firm was worth approximately $500,000 and that
the value of the husband's interest in the contingent fee was worth several million dollars.
91. Id
92. Id at 806.
93. Id at 802 (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 735 S.W.2d 587, 593-94 [Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.]); see Bromberg, Source and Comments, TEx. REv. COv. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b, §§ 1, 5 (Vernon 1970).
94. 765 S.W.2d at 802. Id
95. Id
96. Id at 802-3.
97. Id at 803.
98. Id
99. Id. at 804. There was also testimony that at least two partners who departed from the
firm before the execution of the contingent fee division agreement received their proportionate
interest in the contingent fee. Id
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community may be due for the time, toil and talent of the spouse in enhanc-
ing the separate property. 00 The court observed, however, that no evidence
demonstrated that the husband's share in the contingent fee was based on his
efforts in the case and, therefore, no right of reimbursement accrued. 10'
b. Marshall v. Quinn-L Equities, Inc. 10 2 This summary judgment case ad-
dresses the nature of a limited partnership interest in a limited partnership
whose principal objective is to acquire and develop real estate. Marshall also
raises pertinent liability issues for attorneys who represent or have repre-
sented a general partner in the process of creating a limited partnership. The
case is a consolidation of 26 separate actions involving 26 limited partner-
ships. A law firm that rendered legal services in connection with the limited
partnership offerings was the defendant in 22 of the cases. The plaintiffs
brought numerous complaints against the defendant law firm including al-
leged violations of federal and state securities laws, 10 3 fraud in a transaction
involving real estate or stock in a corporation or joint stock company, 1 4
violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), 105 negli-
gence, professional liability and negligent misrepresentation, 10 6 breach of fi-
duciary duty and constructive fraud, 0 7 and breach of contract.108 The
claims that raise partnership law issues and, to a limited extent, the claims
that raise attorney liability issues, are discussed in this summary.
In considering the plaintiffs' allegations of fraud in a transaction involving
real estate or stock in a corporation or joint stock company, the court ob-
served that the plaintiffs' argument was based on the contention that the
limited partnership interests "constitute real estate because the principal ob-
jective of the limited partnerships was real estate acquisition or develop-
ment."' 09 The court rejected this claim, finding that the plaintiffs purchased
limited partnership interests and not real estate. 110 The court stated that
"[t]he fact that the main objective in formulating the limited partnership was
to acquire and develop real estate does not transform the interests purchased
by the plaintiffs into real property."'' Rather, the court held that the lim-
100. Id. at 805.
101. kd at 806.
102. 704 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
103. Id at 1387-1391. The plaintiffs alleged violations of section 12 of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988); section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988);
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t[a] (1988); and sections
33A(1) and (2) and 33F of the Texas Securities Act (TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1,
§ 33A and F (Vernon 1989)).
104. 704 F. Supp. at 1392. The plaintiffs alleged violations of TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1987).
105. 704 F. Supp. at 1392; see TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-63 (Vernon
1987).
106. 704 F. Supp. at 1394.
107. Id at 1395.
108. Id at 1396.
109. Id. at 1392.
110. Id. The court's finding is consistent with section 26 of the Texas Uniform Partnership
Act, which defines a partner's interest in the partnership as his share of the profits and surplus
of the partnership. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 26 (Vernon 1970).
111. 704 F. Supp. at 1392.
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ited partnership interests "are the kinds of instruments traditionally under-
stood to be securities and intangibles."' 12 Consequently, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' contention that they purchased "goods" and were therefore
consumers under the DTPA1 13 The court distinguished the cases relied on
by the plaintiffs that suggested some securities are also interests in real prop-
erty and therefore "goods" under the DTPA by reiterating that "the
purchase of limited partnership interests is not the purchase of a real estate
interest... and thus... such a security is not a 'good' under the DTPA. ' 114
The Marshall court did find, however, that the limited partners may have
purchased services covered by the DTPA, reasoning that services related to
the sale of securities may be qualifying services when the services are also the
objective of the transaction. 115 Even though the important objective of the
transaction was the exchange of money for securities, the court noted that
the services the general partner would perform on behalf of the limited part-
nerships were key objectives of the transaction. 16 Consequently, the plain-
tiffs met their evidentiary burden to avoid summary judgment, even though
the law firm and the plaintiffs were not in privity and the law firm had not
provided the legal services specifically to the plaintiffs.117
The plaintiffs' claims of negligence, professional liability and negligent
misrepresentation against the law firm were also of interest. The plaintiffs
contended that the law firm represented the limited partnerships and by im-
plication represented the investors as well. 118 The court rejected that argu-
ment and granted summary judgment for the law firm, observing that even if
the law firm were counsel for the limited partnership, that would not auto-
matically make it counsel for the investors.119
c. Sunbelt Service Corp. v. Vandenburg.120 Although this case is of pri-
mary importance to creditors for the point made in response to a usury
claim based on Alamo Lumber v. Gold,121 Sunbelt is briefly reviewed here
because it involved the liability of general partners of a limited partnership.
The court found that when general partners of a limited partnership agree to
personal liability for a portion of the theretofore non-recourse indebtedness
of the partnership 122 as a condition to a lender's forbearance after default,




116. Id at 1394.
117. Id. at 1393.
118. Id at 1394.
119. Id at 1395. The plaintiffs' claims highlight the potential value to the attorney of
sending a representation letter to the client detailing the identity of the client for whom the
attorney is providing services. The plaintiffs also brought claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
which the court rejected because the plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a fiduciary
relationship. The court also observed that the private placement memorandum cautioned in-
vestors not to construe the contents of the memorandum as legal advice and urged potential
investors to seek independent legal counsel. Id at 1396.
120. 774 S.W.2d'815 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1989, writ denied).
121. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1984).
122. A "non-recourse" indebtedness is one for which the maker has no personal liability;
1990]
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the general partner is not considered to have assumed the debt of a third
party.'2 3 Under Alamo Lumber if a lender requires a borrower to assume
the debt of a third party owed to the lender as a condition to the lender's
extension of credit, then the amount of the assumed obligation may be con-
sidered interest charged on the loan. 124 Although the court's discussion was
somewhat difficult to follow, the result is entirely sensible.
7. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
a. Authority of Individual Partner to Sue on Behalf of Partnership; Proper
Citation
(1) Chien v. Chen.125 Chien addressed the issue of whether the entity the-
ory of partnership contained in the Texas Uniform Partnership Act 26 denies
an individual partner the legal authority to prosecute a cause of action held
by the partnership.' 27 The appellate court held that the statute did not have
that effect, and reversed. 128 Chien involved a suit for breach of contract,
common law fraud, fraud in a real estate transaction129 and violations of the
DTPA 130 brought by an individual within the statute of limitations period.
The plaintiff, who had invested in property brought to his attention by the
defendants, later sold the property to a trustee whose undisclosed principal
was one of the defendants. That defendant subsequently sold the property
for a $700,000 profit. The plaintiff, an individual, made numerous amend-
ments to his petition, including several amendments filed after the statute of
limitations period had run, naming several individuals and a partnership as
co-plaintiffs. The trial court entered partial summary judgment against the
plaintiffs. 131
In examining the issue of whether the entity theory of partnership denied
the original plaintiff legal authority to prosecute a cause of action owned by
the partnership, the court of appeals first reviewed the common law rules in
effect before the enactment of the Texas Uniform Partnership Act. The
court noted that at common law, a partnership is not a person for purposes
of litigation and therefore cannot maintain suit in its own name. 132 There-
fore, all partners were required to join as parties to enforce'a partnership
claim unless an exception applied.' 33 The court noted two exceptions that
existed at common law for actions based on contract: (1) where the partner
the debt may be satisfied only from collateral serving as security for the debt. Here, mechani-
cally this was accomplished by the general partner's borrowing from the lender on a full liabil-
ity basis an amount sufficient to bring the partnership debt current.
123. 774 S.W.2d at 817.
124. Id
125. 759 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
126. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 5 (Vernon 1970).
127. 759 S.W.2d at 489.
128. Id. at 492.
129. See TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1987).
130. Id. at §§ 17.41-63.
131. 759 S.W.2d at 488.




making the contract is the only known partner, the partnership constitutes
an undisclosed principal and an action may be brought in the name of all
partners or just that one partner; and (2) where there is a dormant or silent
partner, that partner will constitute an undisclosed principal and may join in
the action but is not required to do so.134
The court then reviewed a 1939 amendment to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure135 that permitted a partnership to maintain suit in the partnership
name, provided that the true parties may be substituted for the partnership
on motion by the court or a party.136 The court characterized the rule as
permissive and concluded that the rule "presumes a continuation of the com-
mon-law rules."' 137 The court then turned to an analysis of the Texas Uni-
form Partnership Act, citing the Act's adoption of the entity theory of
partnerships and its continuation of the common law in any case not pro-
vided for in the Act. 138 The court concluded that there was no legislative
intent requiring all suits to be brought in the partnership name.' 39
The statute of limitations issue raised in the case indirectly involved part-
nership law. Although the original plaintiff filed his petition within the two-
year limitations period, he first alleged the existence of a partnership after
the expiration of the two-year period. The court determined that the
amended petition related back to the filing of the original petition because
the cause of action remained the same.140 Therefore, the bar of limitations
was not established as a matter of law.141
(2) ISO Production Management 1982, Ltd. v. M & L Oil and Gas Explora-
tion, Ina 142 This case addressed the validity of a default judgment in a suit
against a partnership when citation was directed to an individual rather than
the partnership. 143 The plaintiff sued the partnership in its assumed name,
but the citation was directed to the president of the general partner of the
limited partnership. The court observed that the limited partnership was
properly sued in its partnership name since, under Texas law, a partnership
may be sued in its assumed name without the partners being joined as de-
fendants. 4  The Court of Appeals voided the default judgment, however,
because the citation was not directed to the limited partnership, which was
134. Id at 490.
135. Tex. R. Civ. P. 28.
136. 759 S.W.2d at 491.
137. Id. (emphasis in original).
138. Id at 491. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 6132b, § 5 and comments (Vernon
1970).
139. 759 S.W.2d at 492. The court further rejected the defendants' contention "for the
final reason that it necessarily presumes that the Legislature acted quite irrationally." Id.
140. Id. at 493.
141. IM
142. 768 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, no writ).
143. Id. at 355-56.
144. Id See Tex. R. Civ. P. 28; see also Chien v. Chen, 759 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1988, no writ) (discussing the legal authority of an individual partner to prosecute a
cause of action held by the partnership).
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the sole defendant, but rather to an individual. 145
b. Accounting Prerequisite to Lawsuit Between Partners
Kartalis v. Commander Warehouse Joint Venture.146 Well-settled partner-
ship law establishes that one partner may not sue another partner unless
there has first been an accounting to settle all financial matters between
them. 1 47 Among other benefits, the rule tends to promote judicial economy
by eliminating claims that may be offset or otherwise adjusted by amounts
owed by the claimant partner to the other partner. The Kartalis case recog-
nized an exception to the general rule that if the matter is so simple and free
of complexities that it can be readily disposed of, then the normal prerequi-
site accounting is not required. 148 In this case the defendant partner had
refused to pay a straightforward "cash call" made of all partners. 149 The
joint venture agreement specifically provided for the obligation of each part-
ner to pay his proportionate share of operating expenses and the procedure
for determining and making the cash call.
The court explained, as a predicate to its analysis, that this case involved a
joint venture and that joint ventures are generally governed by the same
rules of law that apply to partnerships, including the "free from complexity"
rule that controlled the result here.150 What the court did not say, having
no reason to in this case, is that Texas courts have identified one crucial
difference between joint ventures and partnerships. To find that a joint ven-
ture relationship exists, and thereby gives rise to the application of partner-
ship rules, the court must first find that the parties have agreed to share
losses as well as profits. 151 Therefore, if a business relationship exists be-
tween two or more persons for a limited purpose, such as to develop and
own a single real estate project (the limited purpose being the feature that
normally distinguishes a joint venture from a membership), but the parties
do not share losses, then the relationship may not be governed by Texas
partnership law.
8. SCOPE OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
a. Eglin v. Schober.15 2 In this interpleader action brought by the holder of
an oil and gas lease, the trial court imposed a constructive trust over the
145. 768 S.W.2d at 356. The citation failed to comply with Rule 101 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, which was subsequently repealed on January 1, 1988 and replaced by Rule
99. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 99. The court applied rule 101 in this case because it was the law in
effect on the date of the issuance of the citation. 768 S.W.2d at 355.
146. 773 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
147. Id. at 394; see Chipley v. Smith, 292 S.W. 209, 209 (rex. Comm'n App. 1927, opinion
adopted).
148. 773 S.W.2d at 395.
149. Id. at 394. A cash call refers to a request for a cash contribution to pay partnership
expenses.
150. Id. at 394-95.
151. See, e.g., Tex-Co Grain Co. v. Happy Wheat Growers, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 934, 937-38
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
152. 759 S.W.2d 950 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1988, writ denied).
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mineral interests in favor of the appellees claiming title from one of three
joint venturers. The issue raised was whether a constructive trust could arise
from a breach of the fiduciary duty existing because of the relationship of the
venturers or whether establishing a fiduciary duty separate and apart from
that arising from the joint venture relationship is necessary.15 3 The court
held that no prior and separate fiduciary duty was required. 154
The jury in the trial below found that there was a written joint venture
agreement. 155 The appellees claimed that they were the successors-in-inter-
est to the joint venturer named in the agreement and argued that a construc-
tive trust arose out of that agreement. The appellants, in addition to denying
the existence of a joint venture and the validity of the joint venture agree-
ment, argued that no constructive trust could exist because no fiduciary rela-
tionship existed before and separate and apart from the joint venture
agreement.
The court noted that a fiduciary relationship exists as a matter of law in
certain situations, including the relationship between general partners, and
observed that a joint venture is similar to a partnership and should be gov-
erned by the same basic rules.156 The court stated that a constructive trust
can be based on the prevention of unjust enrichment or on a violation of a
fiduciary duty.157 The court rejected the appellants' argument that to estab-
lish a constructive'trust there must exist a prior and separate fiduciary rela-
tionship, 58 concluding that "the really important circumstance from which
the law will raise a constructive trust is the breach of a confidential relation-
ship and . . . a partnership or joint venture is such a confidential
relationship." 59
b. Johnson v. J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. 160 In Johnson a general partner col-
lected a 15% "developer's fee" from contractors on tenant finish-out con-
tracts for a building that was built, owned and operated by the limited
partnership. The limited partners, two of whom were building tenants,
brought suit for breach of fiduciary duty. The limited partners contended
153. Id at 951.
154. Id at 958.
155. Id at 953. The agreement was a one paragraph statement signed by two of the ven-
turers certifying that the third venturer had an undivided one-fourth interest in certain real
property. Id at 951.
156. Id at 953; see also, Chien v. Chien, 759 S.W.2d 484, 494 n.6 (fiduciary relationship
arises as a matter of law between partners.)
157. 759 S.W.2d at 955.
158. Id at 957. The appellants relied on the following language from Consolidated Gas &
Equipment Co. v. Thompson, 405 S.W.2d 333, 336-337 (Tex. 1966): "for a constructive trust
to arise, there must be a fiduciary relationship before, and apart from, the agreement made the
basis of the suit." The court in Eglin distinguished the Consolidated Gas case observing that
no joint venture was found to exist in the latter case. 759 S.W.2d at 957.
159. Id at 958 (citing with approval the opinion of the court in Gaines v. Hamman, 163
Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557 (1962)).
160. 763 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Austin, 1988, writ denied). Johnson was a highly publi-
cized case concerning Ruben Johnson's activities as general partner of a limited partnership




that a fiduciary relationship existed between them and the general partner
and that the general partner, by failing to disclose the fees paid by the con-
tractors, violated that fiduciary duty. Nineteen limited partners intervened
in the suit, denying that the general partner had breached his duty and
pleading that the limited partnership agreement authorized the collection of
the fees. The jury, however, agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded actual
and exemplary damages. 161
On appeal, the general partner presented four main arguments: (1) no
fiduciary duty existed because the relevant relationship was one of landlord
and tenant;1 62 (2) the partnership and not the individual partners owned any
claim for a breach of the fiduciary duty and the partnership had ratified the
general partner's actions; 163 (3) the fee was authorized by the partnership
agreement; 64 and (4) the exemplary damages were excessive. 65
The court termed the landlord/tenant relationship immaterial, noting that
the "additional landlord/tenant relationship with one's partners does not di-
minish" the fiduciary duty owed to those partners. 66 The court also consid-
ered it significant that the general partner tied the roles of landlord and
partner together by discussing concurrently with one tenant both the
purchase of a limited partnership interest and the lease of office space, and
by offering to finance the purchase of the partnership interest and the tenant
finish-out work.167
The court also rejected the general partner's claim that the partnership
owned the claim for breach of duty, observing that the plaintiffs, and not the
partnership, paid the finish-out construction fees. 168 Although the plaintiffs
also asserted claims on the partnership's behalf at trial, those claims were
severed before judgment was rendered on the individual partners' claims. 169
The court found that the general partner's failure to disclose to the partners
that he would collect a developer's fee from the construction fees paid by the
limited partners was a breach of the duty he owed to those partners. 17 0 Be-
cause the partnership had no claim to share in the individual partners' recov-
eries, the partnership's ratification of the general partner's action was not
controlling. 171
161. Id. at 498. One plaintiff received $14,494.00 as actual damages and $463,202.52 as
exemplary damages; the second plaintiff received $74,801.00 in actual damages and
$694,803.78 in exemplary damages. Id.
162. Id at 499.
163. Id
164. Id. at 500.
165. Id at 502. The court observed that the exemplary damages awarded one plaintiff
were nine times larger than the actual damages, while the exemplary damages of the second
plaintiff were more than 33 times the actual damages awarded. Id
166. Id. at 499.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The general partner also challenged the lower court's action in severing the
causes, but the court of appeals found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the severance. Id at 502.




Finally, the court reviewed the partnership agreement and determined
that despite fairly broad language permitting the general partner to receive
fees, 172 the language allowing receipt of fees was restricted by another sec-
tion of the partnership agreement. 173 The partnership agreement limited the
permissible fees to management fees, leasing commissions, the general part-
ner's fee and an interim loan guaranty fee. 174 Further, the court observed
that the general partner admitted at trial that the developer's fee was not in
any of those four categories. 175
While the court felt that the general partner's actions offended the "pub-
lic's sense of justice and propriety and merits punishment in an amount suffi-
cient to deter similar disloyalty on the part of other fiduciaries,"' 7 6 the court
felt that the exemplary damages awarded to one of the plaintiffs was exces-
sive and suggested a remittitur, which was accepted by that plaintiff.177
9. VALUATION OF PARTNERSHIP INTEREST
Keith v. Keith.17 8 One of the issues raised by this divorce case was whether
the determination of value formula in a partnership agreement was applica-
ble in the event of the divorce of one of the partners. The court refused to
apply the formula, reasoning that the partnership had not been terminated
and noting that "the formula set forth in the partnership agreement with
respect to death or withdrawal of the partner is not necessarily determinative
of the value of a spouse's interest in the ongoing partnership as of the time of
divorce." 179 Apparently, if the partners intend to specify a valuation
172. I at 500. Section 9.1 of the partnership agreement stated in part:
The General Partner shall be entitled to enter into any and all contracts with
third parties, himself or with an affiliate of himself, including contracts pursuant
to which the contracting party will perform any function which the General
Partner is obligated to perform hereunder.... Each Limited Partner, by his
execution of a counterpart of this agreement agrees that any and all fees, com-
missions and other considerations received by the General Partner or any and
all affiliates pursuant to contracts permitted under this Article IX shall be the
sole and exclusive property of the recipient, that the Partnership shall have no
claim whatsoever. therein, and that the participation by the General Partner or
an affiliate in any such permitted contract shall not constitute a breach by the
General Partner or the participant of any duty either of them may owe the Lim-
ited Partners of the Partnership...
I[d
173. Id
174. Id Section 7.1 of the partnership agreement stated: "Except as provides elsewhere in
this Partnership Agreement for management fees and leasing commission fees as provided in
Section 9.1, the General Partner's fee and the interim loan guaranty fee, no Partner shall
receive compensation for services rendered in the initial development, construction and leasing
of the Partnership property." Id
175. I
176. Ird at 503. The court stated that, by taking the developer's fees, the general partner
"acted entirely in his own interest and followed the morals of the market place instead of the
strict loyalty demanded of a fiduciary." I
177. I Exemplary damages awarded to that plaintiff equaled thirty-three times the actual
damages. The revised exemplary damages equaled nine times the actual damages awarded to
that plaintiff. Id
178. 763 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
179. I at 953.
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formula applicable upon the divorce of one of the partners, the partnership
agreement should include such a provision.180
Another issue in the Keith case, although not specifically related to part-
nership law, dealt with professional good will. The husband contended that
the trial court erred by failing to determine the value of good will attributa-
ble to him personally as opposed to good will attributable to the partnership.
The court observed that professional good will attaches to the person, is not
property in the estate of the parties and, therefore, is not divisible on di-
vorce.18' The court of appeals concluded, however, that the husband's fail-
ure to request findings of fact and conclusions of law constituted a waiver of
any error in the trial court's failure to make such a finding.'8 2
180. The trial court apparently found that the wife would not have signed the partnership
agreement if she had thought it would defeat her community interest in the partnership. Id.
The court of appeals declined to rule on the point of error related to that issue, since it had
declined to apply the valuation formula contained in the partnership agreement to which the
wife had consented in writing. Id.
181. Id. at 952.
182. Id. at 953.
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